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Order, Order 
 
 
The orders 
I first came upon Love’s orders of language in Pablé and Hutton’s 2015 book. In it, 
they write: 
First-order refers to: here-and-now activity, on-going communicational activity, 
contextually meaningful behaviour: it is situated, happening in real-time and real-
space, and unfolds in unplanned ways. (Pablé & Hutton, 2015, pp. 28-29)  
Here we are, then, doing a first-order activity, me, writing this now; you, reading this 
later, but also now. The immediacy of the first order is what appeals. It suggests a 
certain freedom: ‘unfolding in unplanned ways’, not relying on a ‘fixed code’. The 
second order, by contrast, one immediately assumes, is restrictive and impeding; an 
objectification of experience into categories that takes away spontaneity, and remains 
at a remove from action.  
There is a sense in which second-order considerations are seen to get in the 
way of or inhibit action. The use of the term ‘first-order’ communication, Love says,  
is to ‘guard against certain misunderstandings, and to emphasise that we’re talking 
about the communicative process as something we engage in, something we do, 
without importing any preconceptions about how it is done’ (Love, 2015). And the 
labels – ‘first’ and ‘second’ – are in no way neutral: they establish a hierarchyi. From 
Pablé and Hutton again: 
In calling a practice or form of analysis ‘second-order’ we are tacitly admitting the 
priority of situated communication against which the practice seems more 
abstract, more concerned with overt norms, and more conscious. (Pablé & Hutton, 
2015, p. 29) 
This ‘tacitly admitting’ is an interesting turn of phrase: are they active or passive 
agents in promoting this hierarchy? And also, by using the word ‘more’ – ‘more 
abstract, more concerned’ – they indicate that within the definition of these two 
orders, there is a spectrum, as opposed to a dichotomy: in which case, there is first-
order communication, and anything with a drop of linguistic reflection becomes 
second-order. This idealisation of purity in the first order can be seen as both a 
theoretical response to orthodox linguistics, in which the ‘pure’ language is not that 
manifested in any particular utterance, but is a removed ideal, and as a political 
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response to any attempt to portray some people’s language as closer to the ideal than 
others. The orders ‘guard against’ these misunderstandings, and, intentionally or not, 
help to fend off the tyranny of orthodox linguists and anyone tempted to use language 
assessment as a measure of intelligence. They protect us against the dismissal of 
language-in-use as being but a poor relative to [a] ‘real’ language. So, it is intended to 
stand against, as Love writes,  
a prescriptivist discourse about language conducted by a subset of the state’s 
citizens who have come to be appointed guardians of the purity of its official 
language, with consequent marginalisation of the language of everyone else. 
(Love, 2009, p. 44) 
I would like first to emphasise my appreciation of this oppositional stance. Placed 
alongside other attempts to alter linguistic status, we can see an incremental change 
effected which has significantly reduced the impact of the hierarchy of dialects, 
although not entirely. ‘Native speaker’ languaging still retains the status of being 
closer to the ‘pure’ ideal; I benefit from both the development and the conservatism in 
this regard, being an English ‘native speaker’, though in an erstwhile denigrated 
Scottish dialect. The ‘acceptability’ of Scottish Standard English has increased, as 
have other regional dialects in the U.K. Due, in part, to changes made in educational 
policy, media expansion, and, in Scotland’s case, increased political capital, the 
stigma attached to using regional dialects and accents has reduced. However, the high 
esteem in which ‘native speaker’ varieties of English are held has not similarly 
declined (Mackay, 2016b). Moreover, the editing this paper has undergone is also a 
purification of sorts, and although done in the name of clarity, the use and ‘policing’ 
of the academic register has its exclusive qualities, indexing, as it does, an ability to 
work with conventions learnt through years of educational training. 
 
First orders: i. Pure, and ii. Contaminated 
However, it seems to me that there are several problems with the orders of language, 
as I understand them. Love writes: ‘We can certainly draw a distinction between 
“pure” first-order languaging and first-order languaging “contaminated” by (second-
order) ideas about abstractions’ (Love, 2015). I am immediately struck by the 
wording: ‘pure’ is a dubious term. It is often held as a moral ideal, in opposition to 
‘evil’, ‘dirty’, ‘mixed’, ‘stained’, ‘compromised’, ‘contaminated’, etc., providing one 
term in an unhelpful (and on occasion harmful) dichotomy. Conceptually too, it is 
 3 
difficult, being normative in both application – who regulates purity? – and in 
definition. In theory, ‘pure’ does not admit of degrees; in practice, even ‘pure gold’ 
labels a very high percentage of purity, not an unalloyed substance. Love’s scare 
quotes alert us to his ambivalence in using the terms, yet use them he has: unfortunate 
if he did not want the resonances of purity and contamination to be brought to bear.  
  The ‘fixed code’ model holds meaning to be pure, being set and defined; 
unadulterated by ambiguity and interpretation. Or more exactly, that the ambiguity 
which undeniably results, is caused by wrongful transference of the code, the 
responsibility for any ambiguity resting with people’s confused usage rather than with 
any inherent ambiguity within the code. And yet, with language (and every other 
semiotic system) we grapple, as speakers and as hearers; as interpreters. This inherent 
ambiguity contradicts the notion of the fixed-code which integrationism sets itself up 
against. Love’s first order – an unreflexive doing of language – assumes that 
contextual factors matter, and that ambiguity of meaning is navigated and negotiated 
in every instance of here-and-now language use. It is worth pointing out that the 
‘fixed-code’ fallacy is possibly not as widespread as it once may have been, or, in any 
case, certainly not as cut-and-dried as Roy Harris, founder of the integrationist 
movement with which Love has identified himself, depicted it. Love writes:  
A language is not a device which, if operated in accordance with the 
instruction manual, automatically yields something objectively discernible as 
‘communication’. (Love, 1998, p. 99) 
I am not aware of any present-day linguists subscribing to – or promoting – a fixed-
code theory, although many may fail to acknowledge the extent to which ambiguity is 
present, and contextual cues relevant. About those holding this watered-down fixed-
code loyalty, Love writes: 
[F]ar from pointing to a need for a radical redefinition of his subject matter, 
indeterminacy is something that the [descriptive] linguist may well decide that 
he can live with. He is apparently not ineluctably bound to take it that the 
indeterminacy of linguistic units demonstrates their non-existence. On the 
contrary, he may feel free to hold that utterances are for the most part readily 
analyzable as manifestations of abstract units, and that such units can be more 
or less reliably identified and inventoried at the various levels of linguistic 
description […] (italics in original, Love, 1998, pp. 98-99) 
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Such a ‘weak claim’ (p.98) is, according to Love, an ‘indefensible attitude’ (p.99). 
First-order communication has no recourse to ‘inventories’ of meaning. 
The sub-discipline of Social Semiotics, influenced by Marx, Voloshinov, and 
Halliday, has, since the early 1980s, been arguing for the role of the language-user to 
be placed centrally, and for agency and imagination in semiotic production and 
interpretation to be foregrounded. In the seminal text by Hodge and Kress, we read 
the following: 
Traditional semiotics likes to assume that the relevant meanings are frozen and 
fixed in the text itself, to be extracted and decoded by the analyst by reference 
to a coding system that is impersonal and neutral, and universal for users of 
the code. Social semiotics cannot assume that texts produce exactly the 
meanings and effects that their authors hope for: it is precisely the struggles 
and their uncertain outcomes that must be studied at the level of social action, 
and their effects in the production of meaning. (Hodge & Kress, 1988, p. 12). 
We can read Hodge and Kress’s ‘traditional semiotics’ as the equivalent to Harris’s 
‘orthodox linguistics’, similarly committed to the fixity of meaning. We can see, too, 
that the ‘level of social action’ is semi-equivalent to ‘contaminated’ first-order 
languaging – although the Marxist leanings of the early social semioticians comes 
through in the choice of the words ‘neutral’ and ‘struggles’; a political cast that is 
generally missing in the integrationist work. The ‘social’ of ‘social semiotics’, is the 
crux of the difference between the two approaches: while integrationists, wedded to 
meaning being made always and only in the moment, cannot then accommodate the 
notion of shared meaning, social semioticians, although agreeing that ‘meaning is 
always negotiated in the semiotic process’ (ibid.), focus on how this is commensurate 
with ‘the flow of discourse in constructing meanings around texts’, and how it is then 
possible – for the sake of academic study – to turn ‘this process itself into kinds of 
text’ (ibid.). For integrationism, ‘nothing is given in advance in communication; signs 
are created in the here-and-now; the relationship between words and ideas, and words 
and things, is not fixed: “meaning is always now”’ (Pablé & Hutton, 2015, p. 44). 
That is, one of the main sites of weakness for integrationism – its inability (because of 
the strictures it puts upon itself) to theorise beyond the individual and the here-and-
now except by each integrationist projecting his or her personal experience of 
language and communication onto everyone (cf. Mackay, 2016a) – is the focal point 
of social semiotics.  
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Simultaneously with the emergence of social semiotics, in the early 1980s, the 
establishment of critical linguistics laid the ground for the founding, in 1991, of a 
critical discourse analytic approach – or critical discourse studies (CDS) – which 
brought together various academics with a shared interest in politically engaged 
research. CDS has at its core the belief that all language use is political, contextually 
determined, normative, and very much un-fixed. One of the strains of CDS has been 
that developed principally by van Dijk, namely the sociocognitive approach, which is 
interested in the study of mental representations and the processes of language 
users when they produce and comprehend discourse and participate in verbal 
interaction, as well as in the knowledge, ideologies and other beliefs shared by 
social groups. (van Dijk, 2009, p. 64) 
The insistence upon the indeterminacy of the word – shared by those within social 
semiotics and critical discourse studies – has, as I said earlier, been a valuable 
contribution. But the way it has been done by the integrationists means, I believe, that 
one fallacy is sacrificed and another set up in its place. Put simply, the fallacy of there 
being a ‘fixed code’ is exposed, and replaced by the fallacy of the existence of a pure 
first order.  
 
First order(s) in context  
What is first order? It is in the here-and-now, it is communicative process. It is that 
which is unstained by considerations of language, by linguistic abstractions. But 
within first-order experience, it is possible (indeed, necessary) to bring to bear one’s 
past linguistic experience, one’s cultural sensitivities. In recent explanatory notes, 
Love says: 
Writing this, I am eventually going to cause marks to appear on your screen to 
which I hope you can attach some fairly specific significance […] This hope is 
founded on the assumption that you will have considerable experience of both 
encountering and producing inscriptions in various respects similar to those 
you are now scanning. If I am right in that assumption, then we are engaging 
in what I would call first-order linguistic communication. (Love, 2015) 
This ‘considerable experience in various respects similar’ is another way of saying 
shared cultural knowledge. And of what is that constituted if not by second-order 
abstractions, generalisations, linguistic (and more widely semiotic) entities? If, during 
this first-order activity, I must rely on the assumption that you can draw parallels with 
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what I am doing and saying, and with what you have prior experience of, isn’t culture 
the resource you call upon? I am relying on your having made generalisations, which 
have come about through abstracting some element out of the flow of experience. 
This ‘enculturation’ is not a determinate fixed-code knowledge, but neither is it 
something entirely unfixed. A culture – a resource of shared assumptions and beliefs – 
is created by identifying (both explicitly and implicitly) things of meaning – of value 
– both positive and negative. How can you simultaneously bring something to bear on 
present experience – an ‘assumption’ – and still imagine that experience to be 
untouched by second-order practices? 
In another paper, Love (Love, p. 5) quotes Harris from The Language Myth (1981): 
Secondly, what is important from an integrational perspective is not so much 
the fund of past linguistic experience as the individual’s adaptive use of it to 
meet the communicational requirements of the present. (Harris, p.187) 
Love follows this up on the following page by stressing the point: ‘We want to know 
what general form that fund might take’ (Love, p. 6). So, within first-order 
communicating, both as producers and as interpreters, we access our prior 
experiences, drawing upon a ‘fund of past linguistic experience’, our ‘demythologised 
linguistic knowledge’ (italics in original, Love, p. 6). Unless the idea is that we have 
access to a searchable memory of every linguistic interaction we have ever been party 
to, a ‘fund’ is going to have to involve classification – and that involves abstractions. 
Two things are striking here: one, that first order is under threat of meaning simply 
something like ‘communication in which none of the participants explicitly flag-up 
their use of linguistic abstractions’; and two, that van Dijk’s sociocognitive model 
may offer a way to conceive of the fund in a way that preserves the individual’s 
primacy, yet bridges the gap – between the individual’s ‘fund’ and the society’s 
influence upon communication – which is insurmountable for integrationism, well, 
pure integrationism anyway.  
Love writes the following: 
As a speaker my task is creatively to deploy parts of that experience so as to 
maximise the likelihood that you will perceive contextually relevant 
similarities between my utterance here and now and other utterances you are 
likely to have come across. As a hearer I have to do my best to understand you 
in the light of that same experience. (Love, pp. 6-7) 
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There is a lot built into this: on the one hand, as we would expect, we have 
importance placed upon creativity and personal experience; on the other hand, one has 
to deploy parts of an experience, and to do so based on a judgement about our 
interlocutor’s judgement about what is ‘contextually relevant’. ‘Deploying parts of an 
experience’: how are we to do that, exactly? We have experiences, we remember 
some of them, but we cannot deploy parts of an experience. What we can do – but this 
is well and truly into the realm of categorisation and abstraction and thus second-
order – is to generalise from our experiences so as to learn from them, and then 
deploy what we have learnt (what we have selected, based on our own or others’ 
criteria about what is of value to us). Love himself recognises the complexity 
involved when he writes about the ‘implicit memory’ ‘it seems that speakers have’ 
and which ‘enable[s] them to assess’ (Love, p. 11): 
The term implicit memory itself suggests that experience with language is 
remembered in a far from straightforward way. There are many dimensions in 
terms of which the raw linguistic event may be categorised, classified or 
analysed. (Love, p. 11) 
I assume that the ‘raw linguistic event’ is another (more poetic, less hierarchical: in 
my view better) stab at naming ‘first-order’ communication. If so, however, we have 
here again the contradiction that the first-order communication occurring in the here-
and-now relies on the deployment of things learnt from implicit linguistic memories 
of prior first-order communicative events, and is, simultaneously, memory-fodder for 
selected other here-and-now interactions. Or to put it more simply: first-order 
communication, notionally without linguistic reflection, relies on the speaker/hearer to 
use their fund of prior (first-order) experiences to navigate the present; this first-order 
experience then joins the fund which is an essential resource for the next first-order 
experience. 
This deployment of experience – conflating a number of complex processes – 
depends, as Love acknowledges, on context. Context, according to van Dijk is 
a subjective mental representation, a dynamic online model, of the participants 
about the for-them-now relative properties of the communicative situation. I 
call such a representation a context model It is this mental ‘definition of the 
situation’ that controls the adequate adaptation of discourse production and 
comprehension to their social environment. (Van Dijk, 2008a 2009) 
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What van Dijk offers here is a way by which the subjective is made amenable to the 
socially shared. He goes on to say that ‘this is just one of the ways in which cognition, 
society and discourse are deeply and mutually integrated in interaction’ (ibid.).  
 
‘Pure’ First Order 
I have tried to think of an example of ‘pure’ first-order communication. I cannot. In a 
fundamental sense language (both spoken and written), having attached to it what 
Love calls ‘some fairly specific significance that goes beyond [its] intrinsic […] 
properties’ (Love, 2015), is already ‘second-order’, if dealing with abstractions is a 
second-order characteristic. The word ‘table’, clearly, has nothing inherently table-
like to it: the understanding of it (to use it or to comprehend it) involves not only a 
recognition of a ‘type’ (a generalised phonetic form of which this example is a token, 
and a generalised conceptual form), but, prior to that, both the understanding that 
human sounds can signify and that our here-and-now experience can be usefully 
classified into discrete phenomena. Abstraction and generalisation are necessary not 
only for all language, but for all comprehension.  
Looking back through the literature, I see that the question of ‘pure’ first-order 
communication is a recurring theme. ‘Pure’ first-order communication is possibly 
found – according to Love – in: 
i) Primitive man’s first utterance understood by another. Love writes that 
‘“Phylogenetically”, the earliest languaging must have been first-order 
languaging in its purest form.’  
(‘Purest’ seeming to back up my understanding of a scale of purity) 
ii) An infant’s first use of language. 
iii) Or in one’s initial exposure to a foreign language, specifically, ‘when 
today you understand an utterance in a foreign language of which you know 
nothing’ (Love, 2015). 
The first is a matter of linguistic speculation and not amenable to much else; the 
second and third seem faulty in the rather obvious sense that in both instances, the 
enculturation has already begun before the production of language takes place: in the 
sense that the child has been immersed in a linguistic world certainly from birth – or 
earlier, from inside the womb – and the language learner functions in a linguistic 
world and utilises lessons learnt from their past linguistic experience to the new 
environment (as discussed further below). 
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The notion of a pure first order did, however, remind me of what I have learnt 
about people with autism, in the work of the neurologist, Oliver Sacks, known best for 
the books in which he conveyed to a wider public insights gained during his 
experience as a medical practitioner, researcher, and academic. In The Man Who 
Mistook His Wife for a Hat (1985), Sacks reflects on a quote:  
‘No man is an island, entire of itself,’ wrote Donne. But this is precisely what 
autism is – an island, cut off from the main […] (Sacks, 1985, p. 221)  
At this point Sacks is discussing an autistic artist, José, and wonders how he could be 
given a place in society rather than simply in an institution. He asks:  
Could he, with his fine eye, and great love of plants, make illustrations for 
botanical works or herbals? […] Could he accompany scientific expeditions, 
and make drawings […] of rare species? His pure concentration on the thing 
before him would make him ideal in such situations. Or (since he cannot read, 
and sees letters only as pure and beautiful forms) could he not illustrate, and 
elaborate, the gorgeous capitals of manuscript breviaries and missals? (ibid.) 
Is this not a clearer description of first-order communication? Devoid of abstractions 
and of cultural references that enables one to both make and navigate meanings; in 
which the written word, and to a large degree the spoken word, are not resources for 
communication? The farther along the autistic spectrum one goes – the more deeply 
autistic a person is – the comprehension of signification, of all things linguistic, 
lessens until, as far as it is understood, sensory chaos is the defining characteristic of 
that person’s external world. Sacks explains: 
The abstract, the categorical, has no interest for the autistic person – the 
concrete, the particular, the singular, is all […] Lacking, or indisposed to, the 
general, the autistic seem to compose their world picture entirely of 
particulars. Thus they live, not in a universe, but in what William James 
[1895, p.10] called a ‘multiverse’, of innumerable, exact, and passionately 
intense particulars. (Sacks, 1985, pp. 218-219) 
These two modes of existing – in a multiverse and in a universe – may map well onto 
the first- and second- orders. And at this point I think that the tenor of the 
classifications – with ‘first’ being pure and ‘second’ being sullied, may qualify for a 
reappraisal. Pure first-order communication (as pure as it can get using a signifying 
system) cannot have recourse to linguistic abstractions. Through linguistic 
abstractions we are able to generalise, to anticipate, to discern, to understand. In fact, 
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we cannot help but use second-order processes: we are compelled to bring our cultural 
knowledge to bear on a situation and to try and understand it linguistically and 
semiotically. Even when faced with nonsense, we make a stab at an interpretation, 
using the pregnancy of words, and any context we see fit to think relevant. That is, the 
culturally embued richness and ambiguity of language is exploited by us as we 
attempt to forge an understanding.  
Love gives, as an example of languaging, ‘understand[ing] an utterance in a 
foreign language of which you know nothing’ (Love, 2015), but in fact, without any 
context, without recourse to any linguistic, spatial, temporal or cultural second-order 
categories, there could be no such ‘understanding’, for the simple reason – again – 
that in order to understand, we need to have something upon which to base our 
attempt to comprehend. It could be countered that it is solely linguistic second-order 
categories we have done without, but why would that be the case? We do not lose our 
awareness of second-order linguistic categories because we are addressed in a foreign 
language: in this instance more than most, we bring to bear all the metalinguistic 
knowledge we can, and we use it to try to understand. Common communicative 
failures such as believing we have just learnt the word for ‘water’, when in fact we 
heard ‘drink’, or thinking we had picked up ‘jump’, when in fact what we were being 
told was ‘over’, demonstrates our deployment of second-order categories. 
Love writes:  
If we are to render our first-order activities as users of language amenable to 
contemplation and inquiry conducted by means of language itself, we must 
abstract certain aspects of those activities from the behavioural continuum in 
which they are embedded and set them up as objects. (Love, 2009, p. 44) 
There is a chicken-and-egg situation here: I would argue that to act within the 
perceptual continuum of life, we must first discern. Discernment requires 
objectification and, thus, abstraction. Therefore, in order to undertake any ‘first-order 
activities’, ‘contemplation and inquiry’ are necessary. This is a fundamentally 
phenomenological point addressed by Merleau-Ponty: 
The supposed conditions of perception become anterior to perception itself 
only when, rather than describing the perceptual phenomenon as a primary 
opening up to an object, we presuppose around it a milieu in which all of the 
developments and all of the cross-checking that will be performed by 
analytical perception are already inscribed, and in which all of the norms of 
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actual perception will be justified – a realm of truth, a world. (Merleau-Ponty, 
2012, p. 17) 
He continues with an example: 
If I am walking on a beach toward a boat that has run aground, and if the 
funnel or the mast merges with the forest that borders the dune, then there will 
be a moment in which these details suddenly reunite with the boat and become 
welded to it […] Afterward I recognized, as justifications for the change, the 
resemblance and the contiguity of what I call ‘stimuli’, that is, the most 
determinate phenomena obtained from up close and with which I compose the 
‘true’ world. (Merleau-Ponty, 2012, p. 18) 
Our ability to ‘compose the ‘true world’’ is what Sacks describes as missing in those 
deeply autistic individuals whose multiverses do not cohere into a universe. 
 
Essential Second Order 
Running through descriptions of the second order is the idea that it is less essential in 
life than the ‘first order’ – that it is secondary, and that we could do without it. Here 
again I was reminded of one of Sacks’ patients, an autistic scientist called Temple 
Grandin, for whom the second-order classification and systematization of linguistic 
terms was crucial to her here-and-nows, and to her becoming a successful scientist. 
She is the person whose self-description of how she often felt amongst humans 
became the title of Sacks’s book An Anthropologist on Mars (1995):  
It has to do, she has inferred, with an implicit knowledge of social conventions 
and codes, of cultural presuppositions of every sort. This implicit knowledge, 
which every normal person accumulates and generates throughout life on the 
basis of experience and encounters with others, Temple seems to be largely 
devoid of. Lacking it, she has instead to compute: others’ intentions and states 
of mind, to try and make algorithmic, explicit, what for the rest of us is second 
nature. […] She remained clearly autistic, but her new powers of language and 
communication now gave her an anchor, some ability to master what had been 
total chaos before. (Sacks, 1995, p. 258) 
Temple Grandin herself uses the term ‘normal person’ normatively, though without 
according it a more positive status than that of ‘autistic person’. The meanings of 
words in dictionaries, the common human responses reified and classified in science 
journals were all she had to go on – these were what gave her ‘new powers of 
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language and communication’. Words are clearly not determinate, but they provided 
enough of an anchor that she could function in the world – albeit on a purely 
professional basis, her life lacking in any real interpersonal relationships. As she put 
it, she still didn’t ‘get it’, but she could exist alongside it.  
Autism as a condition is complex and multi-spectrumed. One spectrum is that 
along which the autistic artist, José, exists: largely unable to integrate second-order 
into life at all – and thereby unable to have any degree of linguistic signification. 
Another spectrum is that on which Temple Grandin is placed: largely unable to do 
spontaneous ‘languaging’ of the type Love calls ‘first-order’, and relying heavily on 
second-order abstractions and classifications to navigate – uncomfortably and 
partially – her here-and-now existence. It seems to me that we are lucky in being able 
to intuitively mingle languaging with second-order abstractions. They are inseparable 
in practice, and for those of us who are not pathologically incapable of intuition, 
generalization, or abstraction, the ease with which we achieve their balance blinds us 
to the fact that at all times we are working on first order and second-order levels 
simultaneously and seamlessly, threatening the orders with a status of redundancy – 
or perhaps relegation to post-second-order linguistic theorizing. 
 
One big happy Orders 
Thus far, then, I have attempted to call into question the existence of a pure first order 
by pointing out 
a. that the terms ‘pure’ and ‘contaminated’ are problematic, 
b. that there is a counter narrative to the integrationist one of an orthodox 
linguistics built on the ‘fixed code’ fallacy, in discourse analytic work 
that emphasises indeterminacy – which is not the same as a meaning-
free-for-all, 
c. that the enculturation which the first order admits relies on the same 
practice of abstraction which defines second-order classification. 
d. that language is itself ‘second-order’. 
However, I am not willing to say that all is second-order as it is delineated. It seems to 
me that if only first-order experiences have the quality of being here-and-now, by 
definition, this classification – first order – encompasses the whole of human 
experience. We cannot get out of the here-and-now. This article started as a 
conference paper, presented to others in the here-and-now, after being prepared at a 
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computer in the here-and-now; and here and now you are reading it in the here-and-
now. Even the there-and-then exists only in recollection in the here-and-now. 
Therefore this first-order quality has to be integrated with meaning making – yours 
and mine – which necessarily involves second-order processes. 
Perhaps first and second order are mutually compatible, and not in conflict – 
not an either /or. Rather than viewing them as dichotomous, we may more profitably 
view them as qualities that can be made more or less explicit, and can be more or less 
salient within any particular and unique communicational event. The focus of our 
attention varies: we can be more analytical, or we can act impulsively, without 
consideration, although always in the here-and-now, and necessarily with recourse to 
the abstract reasoning that allows us to discern things in the world around us. In which 
case, the orders are aspects of our perception of languaging, that we have projected 
onto the acts of languaging which we perceive. 
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i Love has expressed reservations about this reading (during the conference in Odense 
at which this paper was first delivered) arguing that ‘first’ and ‘second’ were not 
intended, by him, to reflect a hierarchy, but rather, to convey the onto- and 
phylogenetic priority of the first order. To imagine that such a ‘priority’ does not 
imply a hierarchy, seems odd.    
